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REDEEMING BOND?
Alison L. LaCroix∗
Professor Heather Gerken subjects the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bond v. United States1 to a range of pointed and well-deserved criticisms. In particular, she notes the circularity of Chief Justice Roberts’s
statutory analysis, writing that “the Court thought the statute was ambiguous . . . [b]ecause it had to be.”2 Gerken also characterizes Bond
as a return to what she terms a “relational” theory of federalism,3 according to which the analysis begins with the power of the states. She
contrasts this approach with what she suggests is the only other alternative offered by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: an analysis that
“defines federal power in isolation.”4 This federal power–driven approach “start[s] with Congress and attempt[s] to delineate the bounds
of its power without reference to the states.”5 In the return to the relational account, Gerken finds something to praise in Bond (although
she notes that the Court “takes the wrong path to get there” by focusing on state sovereignty,6 a concept she believes has become “a campfire story”7). A federalism analysis that starts with the states is clear,
and it avoids the problem of “how to bound the boundless.”8 In the
end, then, Gerken endorses Bond as a demonstration that “[b]ad theory
can make good law or at least halfway decent doctrine” that is
“reasonably manageable and coherent.”9
What Gerken praises the Court for, however, I would argue is a
pervasive, and now deepening, problem in recent federalism doctrine.
The “clear statement” rule of Bond10 — which, given that it breaks
down in the pages of the Court’s muddled ambiguity analysis, Gerken
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law and Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law
School; Associate Member, Department of History, University of Chicago. I thank William
Birdthistle, Will Baude, and Adam Cox for helpful comments and discussion.
1 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
2 Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term — Comment: Slipping the Bonds of
Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 90 (2014).
3 Id. at 97.
4 Id. at 98; see id. at 97–99. I have discussed the differences between the Article I–focused
approach to federalism and a Tenth Amendment–focused one in the context of the Necessary and
Proper and General Welfare Clauses. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I,
123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2047–48 (2014).
5 Gerken, supra note 2, at 86.
6 Id. at 122.
7 Id. at 123.
8 Id. at 101.
9 Id. at 123.
10 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093 (2014).
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rightly treats as existing only in the Court’s description of what it is
doing — appears to be a rule directing that federalism analysis begin
with a search for, and measurement of, the essential localness of the
particular activity to be regulated. Unless the relational, state-focused
account is premised on a substantive commitment to state sovereignty
itself, however — a view that Gerken clearly does not embrace, as she
terms it “mostly claptrap”11 — it is not clear why the relational account is a clearer statement than an Article I–focused approach would
be. By itself, the state-focused approach provides no additional analytical clarity unless it is accompanied by a prior determination of
which side should win in a contest between federal and state power.
If we follow Gerken, however, and disclaim a normative preference
for strong state sovereignty, we might equally well begin the federalism
investigation by looking to congressional power. Starting with Congress’s Article I power does not mean that federal authority is limitless,
any more than starting with the states’ power means that state authority will always prevail. So, if the state-focused approach to answering
federalism questions is not clear, and if one does not endorse a substantive position of strong state sovereignty, what in the end does
Bond contribute to the doctrine on federalism?
In my view, Bond works a significant change in the federalism case
law, but not precisely in the direction that Gerken suggests. Gerken
frames Bond as a crisis averted for more nationalistically inclined
champions of federalism, and as a salutary opportunity to rethink how
a state-focused analysis might be applied to federalism cases. But although Bond initially appears to depend on the relationship between
the state side of the federalism analysis and the congressional side, it
ultimately turns out to be much more about a judicially defined hierarchy of congressional powers. And while the Court labors to conceal
behind a scrim of statutory interpretation its sweeping structural and
supra-textual account of why the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 does not reach Carol Anne Bond’s conduct,
it continues its quiet transformation of federalism doctrine.
I. LOCALNESS AND THE HIERARCHY OF ARTICLE I POWERS
Bond demonstrates that a majority of the Court believes that there
exists a stable category of “purely local” activities.12 We already knew
this; one need only think back to United States v. Lopez13 and, more
recently, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius14
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11
12
13
14

Gerken, supra note 2, at 99.
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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(NFIB), to see the power of “the local” in federalism analysis. But
Bond is different because it shows us the Court formulating a hierarchy of congressional powers that turns in part on the strength of this
localness analysis. Even Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court,
which quickly disavows any need to decide a constitutional question,15
returns repeatedly to the theme of the local.16
Bond gives us a scale of localness that bears directly on the
strength of Congress’s powers: the more local the Court deems the activity in question, the more barriers the Court will place in the way of
congressional regulation. The novelty of Bond is including the power
to implement treaties among the low-level congressional powers — the
suspect ones down at the bottom of the hierarchy, where most activities are local enough to render them largely unregulable by Congress.
And which power is at the top of the hierarchy? The Article I power
without peer, the commerce power: a clause so powerful, a case law so
problematic, that in case after case, the government has declined even
to argue its applicability.17 In the end, then, Bond is a case about the
commerce power.
To see this, let us return to the two main problems with Bond.
First, consider the evident — but perhaps deliberate — confusion
about the basis of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court. Is it
“just” a case of statutory construction, or does the decision in fact turn
on deep constitutional principles? As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the Court’s opinion “starts with the federalism-related consequences of the statute’s meaning and reasons backwards, holding that,
if the statute has what the Court considers a disruptive effect on the
‘federal-state balance’ of criminal jurisdiction, that effect causes the
text, even if clear on its face, to be ambiguous.”18 But an equally striking aspect of the Chief Justice’s opinion — aside from an inexplicably
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087 (stating that the “well-established principle . . . that normally the
Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground on which to dispose
of the case” required the Court to begin with the statutory issue (quoting Escambia County v.
McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16 Id. (referring to “the Constitution’s division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving
the prosecution of purely local crimes to the States”).
17 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)
(No. 08-1224), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1224.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P49L-XABV] (Then–Solicitor General Elena Kagan declined to offer a Commerce Clause–based argument for the federal civil commitment statute on the ground that “the
government has never argued the Commerce Clause here in the sense that it has never argued
that these activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and it hasn’t done so because of . . . the Morrison precedent.” (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the scope of
Congress’s commerce power))); see also LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2072–73 (discussing the role of
the commerce power in Comstock and other cases).
18 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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sharp tone more characteristic of an angry dissent — is its relentless
focus on the “purely local” nature of Bond’s activity.19 As Justice Scalia and Professor Gerken both point out, the statute at issue was not
ambiguous and clearly covered Bond’s conduct.20 Despite the Court’s
statements about sticking to the statutory issue, however, this undeniable foray into constitutional analysis raises the substantive stakes.
Moreover, it gives the Court the rhetorical ability to conjure and then
hold at bay another bête noire, an unfettered federal police power —
the antithesis of a concern for local authority.
This brings us to Bond’s second and more significant consequence:
it continues the recent trend of federalism cases in which the Court
suggests that there is a hierarchy of Article I powers. In such cases,
the Court insists on a distinct domain of “purely local” activity that is
presumptively not federally regulable, and it then measures Congress’s
power relative to the localness of that domain.21 The Court thus has
set up a pair of interlocking scales: first, a scale of localness, which in
turn bears directly on a second scale, the strength of Congress’s Article
I powers. This approach stands in sharp contrast to other approaches
that begin with congressional power, interpret it according to the enumeration principle, and treat it as “supreme within its sphere of action”
before reaching any freestanding concerns about state sovereignty.22
Under the Court’s new approach, the more local the underlying activity is deemed, the weaker the respective congressional power in that
domain must be.
And, paradoxically, the stronger the congressional power, the harder it has become to actually use.23 Here is where the two scales —
localness and the hierarchy of congressional powers — interact. The
consequence of a finding of localness depends on which of the congressional powers is at stake.24 A finding that a particular activity is paradigmatically “local” will outweigh a lower-level Article I power, but it
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19
20
21

Id. at 2083, 2087, 2090, 2092 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2094–95 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gerken, supra note 2, at 89–90.
See generally LaCroix, supra note 4 (discussing cases dealing with the necessary and proper
and spending powers).
22 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 278 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the
carrying out of the domestic policy of any State.”).
23 My colleague Aziz Huq has made a related but distinct argument that the Court has adopted a “tiers of scrutiny” approach to enumerated powers cases. See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny
in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (2013).
24 Note that this discussion focuses solely on Congress’s Article I powers. The question of the
relative hierarchy of the Article I powers versus Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a distinct issue.
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might not squelch a regulation under one of the powers that the Court
increasingly treats as higher-value sources of congressional authority.
The hierarchy of Article I powers that emerges from the Court’s
recent decisions proceeds roughly as follows, in order from strongest to
weakest: commerce power25 (strongest but hardest for Congress to
use); taxing power26 (somewhat less strong, somewhat easier to use);
treaty power27 (still usable after Bond, but perhaps less strong than in
its Missouri v. Holland28 zenith); necessary and proper power29 (least
strong when used on its own, except for persons in federal custody,
based on a misreading of McCulloch v. Maryland30). Indeed, in NFIB,
the potentially broad scope of the necessary and proper power elicited
a particularly notable statement of the hierarchical approach to Article
I from Chief Justice Roberts.31 As I have argued elsewhere, however,
Chief Justice John Marshall’s use of the phrase “great substantive and
independent power” in McCulloch32 was not a limit on the use of the
necessary and proper power,33 but rather a synonym for the phrase
“powers already explicitly enumerated in Article I.”34 The hierarchical
approach to congressional power, therefore, is an innovation of the
recent Court, not a legacy of the early republic.
Moreover, the higher a particular Article I power ranks in the hierarchy, the more sedulously the Court polices the boundaries of that
power. Consider the status of the post-Lopez commerce power: more
constrained than in its mid-twentieth-century heyday,35 certainly, but
still powerful within its sphere, as the post-Lopez amendment to the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
26 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012) (upholding
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on taxing power grounds); see also Sissel v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding ACA against Origination Clause challenge).
27 It should be noted that the phrase “the treaty power” refers not to a single enumerated Article I power, but to the combination of the president’s power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and Congress’s power to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
28 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
29 See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502–03 (2013); Comstock, 560 U.S. at 142.
30 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2076–77 (critiquing this approach).
31 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
32 17 U.S. at 411.
33 LaCroix, supra note 4, at 2062 & n.81, 2079 & n.148.
34 Id. at 2079 n.148.
35 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding production quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938).
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Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199036 and a host of decisions concerning
regulations of interstate markets37 demonstrate. Yet the outer boundaries of the power remain deliberately untested, and its limiting precedents seem to be accorded more than the usual precedential weight.
This tension in Commerce Clause doctrine stems at least in part
from recent administrations’ decisions not to press the Court to revisit
the Lopez and Morrison tests, even in cases where the commercepower rationale would seem particularly apt — for example, in connection with federal criminal statutes.38
II. THE TROUBLE WITH LOCALNESS AND HIERARCHY:
ONE SCALE TOO MANY
The problems with the hierarchical approach to congressional
power begin with the fact that it simply is not warranted by the text or
the structure of the Constitution. Nowhere does Article I state that
certain of its clauses are entitled to more judicial deference than others. Moreover, to the extent that the hierarchical approach to congressional power relies on an initial assessment of some elusive degree of
localness in the underlying activity, it is not clear why a local activity
regulated under a treaty-implementing statute should be subject to
greater scrutiny than an equally local activity regulated under the
commerce power.
Local power, territory, and even sovereignty are vital and necessary
parts of a federal union; without a local sphere, a federal union is
something else entirely — not a federal, but an “incorporating” union,
to borrow a distinction made by John Witherspoon on the floor of
the Continental Congress in August 1776.39 The designation of an
activity or a power as local is thus central to dividing power within a
federation. The scope of the federal legislature’s authority is not without limits, but it should not depend on judicial assessments of local–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
36 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone”).
37 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding penalties against the production
and use of home-grown medicinal marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act); cf.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566 (upholding the individual mandate provision of the ACA and thus its
effects on interstate healthcare markets, albeit under the taxing power but not the commerce
power).
38 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (“The Government frequently
defends federal criminal legislation on the ground that the legislation is authorized pursuant to
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals
held that the Government had explicitly disavowed that argument before the District Court.”);
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 21–22.
39 Quoted in John Adams’ Notes of Debates, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS
593 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979).
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ness. Bond illustrates the novel and damaging effects of the localness
and hierarchy inquiries on modern federalism analysis.
How does this pair of sliding scales appear in the Bond decision?
First, the Court suggests that if a given allegedly criminal act seems
local — an attempt to cause a skin rash in a spouse’s new partner, for
example — then the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act presumptively does not cover it.40
But what if the chemicals Ms. Bond used had traveled in interstate
commerce, or if their illegal distribution might affect an existing interstate market in such compounds? Surely Congress could criminalize
Ms. Bond’s conduct under its interstate commerce power — the fount
of much of federal criminal law dating back to the earliest days of the
republic — without having to resort to the more cumbersome treatyplus-statute mechanism. Assuming the underlying conduct was economic (for example, the purchase of such chemicals in order to poison
a rival), a federal statute criminalizing such conduct under the
commerce power would seem unproblematic.
In short, one can easily imagine a scenario in which congressional
power under the Commerce Clause would extend to criminalizing the
local activity at issue in Bond without resorting to the treaty power.
In other words, if Congress had used a stronger regulatory weapon
from within its Article I arsenal, it could perhaps have won a more resounding victory in Bond, despite the localness of the underlying activity. Given that fact, the Court’s supposedly key analytic factor, localness, cannot bear the weight the Chief Justice’s opinion places on it.
Judicial assessments of localness do not define the boundaries of Congress’s power under Article I; those boundaries are set forth in the language of Article I itself. However local the doorknob, no one would
think of pointing to Second Ypres in order to defeat the prosecution of
an interstate purchaser of poisonous chemicals.
III. THE TREATY POWER AS A FEDERATIVE POWER
The power to conduct external affairs, including the power to enter
into treaties, is a crucial duty of the central level of government in any
federal system. John Locke described it as “the management of the security and interest of the publick without.”41 The “federative Power,”
as Locke termed it, comprised the “Power of War and Peace, Leagues
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092 (noting that “the background principle that Congress does not
normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal
prosecution for a chemical weapons attack” and contrasting Bond’s case with the “handful of
prosecutions” that have been brought under section 229).
41 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth.”42 For all their chariness toward
strong federal power deployed domestically, the Articles of Confederation clearly deposited the full array of external powers in “the United
States in Congress assembled.”43
Locke and the Articles are primary sources for the eighteenthcentury view of the purpose of the treaty power.44 But Locke’s theory
of the federative power is relevant not only for historians or for
originalists. It also illustrates the problems with the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the treaty power in Bond. Those shortcomings are evident in light of founding-era sources, doctrinal keystones such as
McCulloch v. Maryland, and pre– and post–New Deal understandings
of congressional power — in short, the entire sweep of American constitutional law. The ability to “assume among the powers of the earth,
[a] separate and equal station” in 1776 included the powers necessary
to operate as a state on the international stage.45 Even if the Court
persists in a hierarchical view of the Article I powers, the treaty power
should be understood as an essential vector of federal authority outward to the arena of nation-states. The sovereignty claims of the several states are therefore largely irrelevant to its exercise.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42
43
44

Id.
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, IX.
See DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 23, 154 (2003).
45 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

